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The Bolivian Tin Mining Industry 
in the First Half of the 20th Century 
Introduction 
Tin was known since pre-colonial days and has been mined since about the 
beginning of the 17th century. In his Relation de Oruro (1608), Phelipe de 
Godoy comments on tin mining, and Alvaro Alonso Barba in Arte de los 
Metales (1640) reports that tin was worked in Carabuco, Chayanta, and 
Colquiri. According to the British envoy Joseph B. Pentland, there was a 
regular exploitation in Oruro in the early 19th century, and tin was exported 
to the United States, France and England. In that period the main use of tin 
was as an alloy for the manufacture of brass. 
While Bolivia entered independence with a tin industry, it was not until the 
20th century that tin ruled the economy. In the words of Sergio Almaraz: '[In 
Bolivia] the 20th century arrived on the shoulders of tin mining'.1 The 
growth of the tin plate industry and the use of tin in wire coating for the 
expanding electrical industry, caused the demand for tin ores to increase 
significantly, and tin became the most precious and scarce of all common 
metals. 
In this paper, I will outline the development of the Bolivian tin industry 
from the middle of the 19th century to the nationalisation of the main mines 
in 1952. I shall concentrate on the changes in the international and domestic 
economy that enabled this development, analysing the performance of the 
major mining companies and the impact of the tin mining industry on 
Bolivian economic development. 
The whole issue of tin mining and the role it played in the social, political 
and economic development of Bolivia has been highly mythologised, in part 
as a result of the importance of tin mining in the country's history, and in 
part due to the incipient development of historiography in Bolivia. In this 
essay, I will review the current state of scholarship on the subject. Since 
there exists no serious study of the political influence of the mining industry, 
I will not address this important subject here. Instead, I will concentrate on 
the economic and technical aspects of the development of the tin mining 
industry, based on both the main secondary sources and archival material, 
particularly that derived from the Patino Mines Archive in El Alto and the US 
National Archives in Washington, DC. At the same time, the sheer economic 
importance of tin requires an appraisal of the relationship between the state 
and the mining industry, undertaken here principally through an analysis of 
fiscal policy implementation and of the contribution of resources from the tin 
mining industry to the state and to the economy at large. 
From the mid-19th century to the First World War 
Until 1850, Bolivian participation in the international market was limited by 
several factors. Internally, transportation difficulties were a major obstacle; 
externally, the quality of the Bolivian mineral ores imposed limits to its 
participation, and the structure of the market was by itself unfavourable.2 
From the mid-1850s, increases in tin consumption associated with the 
growing use of tin plate, particularly in cans, caused long term price rises as 
production failed to respond with sufficient speed. As a result, during the 
second half of the 19th century, interest in Bolivian production increased. 
Furthermore, improvements in smelting technology enabled the refining of 
Bolivian ores in Great Britain, a country that increasingly depended on 
Bolivian production. German smelters also took an interest in Bolivian ore, 
and built a foundry in 1891 for its treatment. As a consequence of these 
changes in the international market the five-year average metallic tin export 
increased more than ten-fold between 1850-54 and 1895-99 (from 795 to 
7,541 long tons) and the export of tin mineral ores (concentrates) rose by a 
factor of thirty-six (from 870 to 23,150 fine long tons).3 
This response of the industry to the market stimulus relied largely on the 
material infrastructure and human resources developed during the silver 
mining period which preceded that of tin mining. Silver mining had trained 
technicians and qualified labour, and gave rise to a group of 'entrepreneurs' 
with mining, commercial and technical knowledge who performed as the 
pioneers of the tin mining industry. The transition from silver to tin, 
however, was not as easy or automatic as has been suggested. John Hillman 
has estimated that tin production was 9,000 fine long tons in 1899 and that 
only about 40 percent came from sources closely linked to the silver 
production. However, he points out that most of the remainder was being 
produced by people formerly associated with the silver mining industry.4 
The last major obstacle to the expansion of the industry was cleared with 
the inauguration of the Oruro-Antofagasta railroad in 1892. Railroad 
transport eliminated the limitations imposed on exports by pack-animal 
transportation, reduced transportation costs (particularly improving traffic 
regularity and reducing travel time, more than in actual freight reductions), 
and expedited the import of machinery. 
In the first decades of the 20th century, the growth of Bolivian production 
was spectacular. As a direct response to price and demand increases,5 
production - measured by exports (no production figures are available) -
more than doubled between 1900 and 1910 (from 9,740 fine MT to 22,885 
fine MT); in the next decade it increased a further 30 percent, reaching 
28,230 fine MT (see Graph 1). As a result Bolivian production rose from 12 
percent of world supply in 1900 to 20 percent in 1910.6 Likewise, the 
importance of tin in the Bolivian economy increased significantly. Tin 
exports increased from 40 percent of the total value of exports in 1900 to 60 
percent in 1905, and this level was maintained till the twenties when tin 
exports represented 70 percent of the total value of exports (see Graph 2). 
This rapid expansion of production - at an annual growth rate of 5.9 
percent (Table 1) - is only explained by developments in the tin mining 
industry in the 19th century and the richness of the deposits, which, at least 
in the first stage, could be readily exploited. Although Bolivian tin deposits 
were underground hard rock, high tin contents enabled certain ores to be 
hand-picked. This material, known as guia, was bagged in the mines and 
exported with assays of 60 percent fine tin content. The tin mining industry 
was not, however, exempt from problems, particularly inland transport 
difficulties, high fuel costs, and labour shortage.7 
Transportation problems were partially solved by the Liberal Party's 
policy of railroad construction that speeded up transport from the mining 
areas to the Pacific Ocean. The completion of the Guaqui-La Paz railway in 
1905, the Rio Mulatos-Potosi railway in 1912, the Oruro-Viacha line in 1913 
(which reached La Paz in 1917), the Uyuni-Atocha railway in 1913, and, 
finally, the Arica-La Paz railway also in 1913, all increased the Bolivian 
economy's links with abroad.8 However, difficulties persisted with 
communications between the production centres and the railways, and often 
the costs incurred over this stretch were higher than the railway freight to the 
port. This transport (mine-railway) was irregular and subject both to the 
rainy season (which made crossing rivers difficult) and to the drought season 
(which reduced forage availability for the animals) so it became common to 
store ores in the mine. Transport from the mine to the mill also experienced 
the limitations and mishaps associated with the use of mules, donkeys and 
llamas. It is within this context that we must view the concern of the dynamic 
entrepreneur Simon Patino to 'free himself' from transport by pack animal. 
In 1904, he installed an aerial rope way to move his mineral from the mine 
to the mill, and in 1911 he began a project to construct the 
Machacamarca-Uncia railroad to link his mines with the railroad trunk 
network. The railway was completed in 1921 at a cost of $5 million.9 
An inadequate supply of native fuel (in terms of both quantity and heating 
power) and the high cost of coal, were both partially accountable for the high 
railroad transportation costs. The scarcity of native coal and the high cost of 
the imported product, were key elements in ending tin smelting in Bolivia. 
To smelt tin of adequate quality and at a competitive cost in the 20th century, 
reverberatory furnaces were required, something not feasible without a 
source of cheap power. In mines distant from the railway where the cost of 
coal was prohibitive, yareta (a local shrub) or dry llama dung were used as 
fuel, but their low caloric value limited their use to heating water for steam 
generation and calcination. Forging required coal. Diesel oil (also imported) 
was required to generate electric power for the mills, and it was not until 
1916 that hydroelectric power was generated in Catavi. 
Labour shortage was a problem of longer duration. The initial rapid 
growth of mining demanded a larger labour-force than was immediately 
available. Moreover, the expansion of tin mining had to compete for labour 
with railroad construction in Bolivia and the Chilean nitrate industry. The 
irregular provision of labour - which was also subject to the agricultural 
cycle - was undoubtedly an important element for the early mechanisation of 
many mines during the 1912-1915 period, when air drills were introduced, 
alongside machinery to replace the handling of the ore. The majority of mines 
were located at great altitudes and the very harsh working conditions in mines 
clearly acted as a disincentive for the potential labour force.10 
There was also a notable shortage of technical and administrative 
personnel. This was initially resolved by bringing in foreigners, the training 
of mining engineers within the country only starting in 1917 in the Escuela 
Nacional de Ingenieria in Oruro, with expansion in 1937 to the University of 
Potosi. This enabled a gradual replacement of foreign engineers by Bolivian 
engineers trained locally and abroad throughout the first half of the century. 
In Patino Mines, for example, Bolivian engineers increased from 16 percent 
of the total corps in 1937 to 48 percent in 1941. Nevertheless, the mining 
demand for engineers could not be entirely met by Bolivians and foreigners 
were employed even after nationalisation, especially in senior technical and 
administrative positions.11 
I estimate that the number of people employed in tin mining quadrupled 
from 1900 to 1907, increasing from 3,000 to 12,700 as a result of the boom 
in that period, when both the number of mines in production and employment 
in mines already producing increased. After 1907, the increase in labour 
employed was more gradual, reaching about 15,000 people in 1910 and 
17,000 in 1925. It is exceptionally difficult to reach a reliable estimate of the 
total number of people employed by the tin mining industry thereafter, but an 
indirect indicator is the variation in employment in the whole mining industry 
(tin and other minerals) and in the major company, Patino Mines (see table 
2). When considering these figures, however, one should not lose sight of the 
seasonal character of most of this labour. This gave rise to a permanent and 
specialised labour force (drill hands and mechanics), and a temporary, 
non-specialised one, employed in opening new galleries and in the portage of 
ore. 
In this early period (1900-1915), production methods were primitive and 
not very different from those used in the 18th and 19th centuries. With very 
few exceptions, exploitation was unsystematic; there were no geological 
maps and production was undertaken without previous planning, exploiting 
only the richest and most accessible veins, with the least possible capital and 
until the mineral deposit deteriorated, before moving on to a new one. The 
very wealth of the tin deposits allowed this type of work. In sharp contrast, 
in the silver mining industry, where deposits were poorer, prices lower and 
companies established for longer, exploitation was carried out in a markedly 
more rational and scientific manner. In tin mining the use of machinery was 
minimal: in 1900 only Huanuni had steam machinery. The increase in prices, 
the arrival of railroads, and the greater availability of capital, expedited the 
large scale import of machinery and concentration mills starting in 1908.12 
The main source of capital for the mining industry at the beginning was 
from traders in the form of advance payments on future production or credit 
on mining supplies. But these modest sums could only meet short term capital 
demand. Since the participation of local banking was marginal, investment 
capital was necessarily sought abroad. After 1906 (when the Peace Treaty 
with Chile was signed, fixing disputed national frontiers) there was 
significant inflow of Chilean capital as more companies were floated in the 
Santiago Stock Exchange. The principal Chilean purchase was that in 1906 
of the Llallagua mine, the richest in Bolivia. In 1912 Chilean investment in 
Bolivian mines amounted to £2.6 million. By 1913, foreign capital investment 
exceeded £10 million and was mostly Chilean, British, and, to a lesser 
degree, US in origin.13 
Capitalisation of the mining industry facilitated the emergence of 
production in a group of 'modern' companies characterised by their greater 
mechanisation of both mining and concentration, their more developed 
administrative organisation, their access to greater working capital, and by 
their direct marketing of ores. This group - comprised of the Aramayo 
Francke Mines Ltd (registered in London in 1906), the Compania Estamfera 
de Llallagua (registered in Santiago, Chile, in 1906), the Patino Group 
(Compania Minera La Salvadora, Empresa Minera Huanuni, Compania 
Uncia, and others), and the Compania Minera y Agricola Oploca de Bolivia 
(registered in Santiago, Chile, in 1906) - accounted for 55 percent of total 
national production in 1912 and by 1917 had exceeded 65 percent.14 
Except during the 1907 crisis, which caused the closure of several small 
mines and provoked unemployment across the industry, the pre-war period 
was distinctly favourable for Bolivian tin mining: both prices and demand 
continued to increase. However, when the London Metal Exchange closed 
(August, 1914) at the outbreak of World War One, the industry suffered the 
effects of the fall in prices and demand until mid-1915; many mines were 
closed and wages (hitherto in ascent) were depressed. Moreover, 
unemployment spread as the construction of railroads was paralysed and 
work in the Chilean nitrate mines decreased. The mining crisis rebounded on 
commercial activity, which was in turn affected by a severe credit restraint. 
The decrease in mining production and exports led to a shortage of drafts on 
London (foreign exchange in pounds sterling) and so caused a considerable 
drop in imports. This had a negative effect on fiscal income, since taxes on 
imports (as a percentage of total value) were five times higher than the tax 
rate on exports. To cover the deficits, in view of the impossibility of 
increasing the taxes on the mining industry, the Government requested 
advances from exporters in the form of Vales de Aduana for Bs. 10,250,000. 
To overcome the shortage of foreign exchange, the government issued a law 
requiring exporters to deliver 10 percent of the value of their exports in drafts 
to the Banco de la Nacion.15 
The war-related depression affected the modern companies differently. 
These had already secured a financial stability that allowed them to stop their 
production - as in Aramayo Francke - or reduce it - as in Oploca - and 
concentrate their efforts in development operations, while processing their 
tailings to keep their mills running and their skilled labour employed 
(unskilled labour was made redundant). Once the market opened again, these 
companies resumed exporting, benefiting from the higher prices, and in 
addition selling both their accumulated stocks and new production.16 
An important effect of the war was the change in the destination of 
Bolivian foreign trade. Before the war, most imports and exports had been 
to and from Europe, particularly Britain. The war made trading with Europe 
difficult and increased interest in the USA in establishing foundries of their 
own and buying tin mineral ores directly from Bolivia despite British 
opposition. Three foundries were built in the USA, the most important by 
American Smelting and Refining Co. (ASR) with 8,000 short ton capacity. 
ASR ensured the supply of Bolivian mineral ores by offering the mining 
companies attractive advance payments that helped to reactivate the mining 
industry in 1916. US interests also attempted to control ore production by 
offering to buy several established companies. Rubber, antimony, wolfram 
and other ores were now exported to the USA. By providing the local market 
with drafts on New York (foreign currency in dollars) rather than on London 
(because of restraints on trade with Europe), these exports enabled the 
importation of US products. Trade between the USA and Bolivia was 
consolidated to such an extent that when smelting of Bolivian ores in the USA 
was stopped in 1923, other commercial ties were not greatly affected.17 
The war also had effects on the big mining companies. It forced Patino to 
abandon his interests in Germany (where he sold his ores) and to develop 
them in England, where he invested in the Williams Harvey foundry. On the 
other hand, Aramayo Francke Mines, originally registered in London in 
1906, was forced to change residence and move to Switzerland under the 
name of Compagnie Aramayo des Mines en Bolivie, due to the high taxes in 
Great Britain.18 
When the war ended, the over stock of mineral ores in the USA caused a 
ban on tin imports that lasted until early 1919. This had a particularly adverse 
effect on the Bolivian industry because 40 percent of total production was 
now traded in the USA. However, the problem was shortlived, and once 
overcome, Bolivian tin mining benefited from the brief post-war combination 
of rising prices and a strong demand. 
The 1920s 
Having reached an unprecedented level in 1920, tin prices dropped in line 
with the world economy's business recession, and stocks began to 
accumulate. This state of affairs caused the implementation of the first price 
control agreement by the governments of Dutch Indies and Malaya, which by 
1922 had accumulated almost 15 percent of the world production in the 
notable 'Bandoeng Pool'.19 
This was fully evident in Bolivia, particularly in 1921 when tin exports 
dropped to 19,086 fine MT, after having reached 29,280 fine MT in 1918 
(Table 1). As to the effects of the crisis on different sectors of the Bolivian 
mining industry, the comment of the Mining Journal of January 1922, 
captured the situation succinctly: 
Unlike Malaya, the bulk of the Bolivian production is by four large 
producers, who can afford to contract or expand their production at 
will, and are not obliged to work harder in bad times to make ends 
meet. 
The publication added that large producers preferred not to deplete their 
reserves during periods of low prices, but rather take advantage of the 
occasion to reduce their labour force. It also noted, however, that the small 
mines were forced to close, while the medium ones increased their production 
(supposedly they now needed a larger production in order to pay back their 
advance payments). But 'the main cause of the reduction', the article 
concluded, 'is the voluntary curtailment of the rich concerns'.20 This 
comment indicates the new structure of the Bolivian mining industry and of 
the capacity for survival of the big companies in a time of depression. In this 
production concentration process a dominant role was played by Simon 
Patino, who had bought the interests of the Irishman John Minchin (the 
Compania Minera de Uncia) in 1910, those of the British Penny and Duncan, 
and the Compania Minera El Balcon (also of British capital), to form the 
Compania Minera Huanuni in 1911.21 
Once the crisis was over, the period from 1924 to 1928 proved to be one 
of boom. Bolivian production increased throughout these years reaching an 
all-time high of 47,191 fine MT in 1929. During the 1920s, Bolivian 
production came to represent between 18 percent (1921) and 24 percent 
(1929) of total world production.22 Between 1920 and 1929, exports grew 
at an annual rate of 5.9 percent, a growth rate similar to that registered in the 
preceding period (1900-1919; Table 1). This rise is explained by the large 
investment flow during the first half of the decade. It has been estimated that 
between 1920 and 1926, investment in tin mining industry amounted to $27.2 
million including investments in both new operations and capitalisation of 
existing ones. Out of this total, $12.1 million corresponds to the 1920 
investments of the US Guggenheim Bros, in the Caracoles Tin Company of 
Bolivia.23 Guggenheim Bros, was also interested in buying other 
companies, investing almost $1 million in 70,000 shares of the Aramayo 
Company after several unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement with 
Carlos Victor Aramayo to buy 50 percent of his shares.24 In 1928, 
Guggenheim Bros, obtained an administration contract from Aramayo in 
exchange for a share in profits. However, this contract only lasted until 1933 
when Aramayo took advantage of the tin crisis and the heavy losses in 
Caracoles to buy this mine from Guggenheim.25 
The continuous growth of tin mining increased the importance of the 
industry for the national economy. In the second half of the 1920s, the value 
of tin exports reached its highest level, surpassing 70 percent of the total 
value of exports (Graph 2). The primary measurement for quantifying the 
contribution of the mining industry to the economy has always been the taxes 
paid by the mining industry to the government. However, we should not lose 
sight of the significant regional impact exercised by mining activity by 
creating a demand for domestic consumer goods (promoting manufacturing 
and agriculture) as well as for imported goods that, when entering the 
country, paid import taxes and gave rise to a strong import sector. An 
example of this may be seen in the urban, commercial and financial 
development of Oruro, described in 1912 by a French observer as the 'home 
of industrial and commercial progress', with nine banks, two agencies and 
several factories and commercial premises.26 The effect of the mining 
industry on the rural areas still remains to be studied, particularly in terms 
of its role in introducing a commercial/cash economy to the peasantry. There 
is no doubt, however, that the mining industry was not the great 'engine of 
growth' of Bolivian development that it could have been. The reason for this 
is beyond the purpose of this paper; but we should register two factors of 
clear relevance: (i) governmental incapability to extract higher taxes from the 
mining industry, particularly during the first decades, together with the 
inefficient use of that income which was generated; and (ii) the factor that the 
major mining companies, after obtaining large profits, did not invest in the 
country.27 
The classic indicator for quantifying the contribution of the mining 
industry to the national economy has been the percentage obtained by 
dividing the overall amount the mining companies paid in export tax by the 
total value of mining exports. This percentage increased from a decennial 
average of 2.7 percent in the first decade up to 4 percent in the second one, 
reaching 9.2 percent in the 1920s.28 However if we consider not only total 
taxes paid but also company profits, the figure rises appreciably, in the case 
of 1925, for example, from 9.1 to 17.7 percent.29 Likewise, the value of 
export duties paid on tin as a percentage of total fiscal income increased from 
an average of 6 percent for the five-year period between 1901-04 up to 22 
percent for the 1916-20 quinquennium (see Graph 2). 
Until the early 1920s the main tax on mining was the export tax, with a 
sliding scale based on international prices. In 1920, general fiscal difficulties 
encouraged the government to introduce the first profit tax into the statute 
book. But it was not until 1923 that a serious profit tax was levied in practice, 
in order to cover the financial obligations of the 'Nicolaus' loan, contracted 
in 1922 to refinance the public debt (including the Vales de Aduana of 1915 
and 1916) by the Bautista Saavedra administration (1921-1925). The new law 
of 1923 specified the amounts that could be deducted to establish the profit 
and so overcame one of the central shortcomings of the previous legislation. 
This improvement plus the existence of a suitable agency for collecting the 
taxes (the Comision Fiscal Permanente, created to control the 1922 loan) 
were important elements in the significant increase in taxation on the mining 
industry (the percentage of total taxes on export and on profits relative to the 
value of exports rose from 7.4 percent in 1923 to 15.6 percent in 1924).30 
According to Gomez D'Angelo, this decade more than any other distinguishes 
itself precisely because the taxation system proved capable of extracting a 
significant portion of any increase in the value of mining production.31 
However, from the 1920s the relative importance of tin export duties on total 
national income began to decrease (see Graph 2), as resources from the profit 
tax and foreign currency control (from the 1930s onwards) became the 
preferred mechanisms by which the government obtained resources from the 
tin mining industry. 
The comparative importance of the different taxes paid by the mining 
industry and the greater absolute amount of resources 'extracted' from the 
industry by the state in the 1940s are well illustrated in Table 3. Based on 
Patino Mines data, this shows that export taxes accounted for 50 percent of 
the total taxes paid in the 1920s and profit taxes 30 percent. The relative 
significance of both taxes dropped significantly in the second half of the 
1930s when exchange difference taxes accounted for over 50 percent of total 
taxes. This reinforces my point that export taxes are but a poor proxy 
indicator of the mining industry's contribution to fiscal resources, whose 
significance drops significantly after the 1920s. 
As might be expected, the mining industry opposed these measures. 
Precisely when a new tax increase was imminent, Patino took advantage of 
the lack of state funds to complete the Sucre-Potosi railroad, the conclusion 
of which was the subject of much regional pressure. He extended a £600,000 
loan to the Saavedra administration under the condition that taxes on the 
mining industry would not be further increased for five years.32 
Patino had offered the loan to the government for the first time on 6 
August, 1924, after buying the Compania Estanifera de Llallagua from 
Chilean interests and registering Patino Mines and Enterprises Consolidated, 
Inc. (formed by the merger of the Compania Estanifera de Llallagua, 
Compania Minera La Salvadora and the Machacamarca-Uncia Railroad) in 
Delaware, USA. This acquisition completed a share purchasing process in the 
Compania Estanffera de Llallagua started in 1914 through the British firm 
Duncan Fox and afterwards through the Anglo-South American Bank. The 
purchase of the Compania Estanifera de Llallagua - the main tin producer -
and the further establishment of Patino Mines in the USA are without doubt 
two landmarks in the development not only of the tin mining industry but also 
of Bolivian capitalism in general. Patino has been the sole Bolivian capitalist 
(and one of the few from any peripheral country) who succeeded in forming 
an authentic transnational company (with interests in four continents and over 
five countries) from a base in his own country. It is, then, worth considering 
some of the factors in this accomplishment. 
To understand the creation of the 'Empire', we must consider not only the 
characteristics of the environment in which Patino developed his mining 
interests and those of the tin market, but also Patino's skills as a 
businessman. The consolidation and initial expansion of Patino's interests 
must be seen in the context of Bolivian political instability, economic 
underdevelopment and geographic isolation, all of which limited the influence 
of foreign investors and so gave his enterprise a valuable initial 
independence. This independence was reinforced by the extraordinary wealth 
of La Salvadora. The nature and condition of the market also provided two 
key advantages: (i) concentration of tin production and consumption in few 
countries, and a market centralised in London, making its control easier than 
that of other metals;33 and (ii) the virtually constant rise in price and 
consumption during the first three decades of the century.34 These are 
undeniably critical factors, but it would be hard to disagree with Herbert 
Klein when he states that without the 'extraordinary skill and administrative 
foresight', and the early and intensive investment in 'expert engineers and 
foreign administrators, in the best modern machinery, and in expensive 
transportation systems... [Patino] would never have come to create the wealth 
he created'.35 Finally, the decision to establish Patino Mines in the USA 
reflects Patino's foresight that proximity to the main financial and 
stock-market centres was vital for the future of his empire. It is worth 
emphasising that, whilst the 'modernity' of Patino's enterprise was in many 
aspects shared by the other two big groups, the companies of Aramayo and 
Hochschild - there were fundamental differences. Aramayo's origins dated 
to the silver mining industry of the 19th century, and he had immediate 
access to foreign capital by establishing Aramayo Francke Mines in London, 
in 1906. Hochschild, on the other hand - besides being a European Jewish 
immigrant - became involved in mining exploitation proper, through the 
commercial sector (trading minerals and financing existing companies and 
then administering others). Moreover, Hochschild had an important 
comparative advantage: he had close contacts with an influential German 
metal firm, Metallgesellschaft, and had extensive trading experience before 
coming to Bolivia.36 
Since 1925, the voice and the interests of the big mining industry was 
channeled through the Asociacion de Industrials Mineros, which grouped the 
main mining companies and mineral traders and had as its main purpose the 
defence of the interests of the mining industry.37 The Asociacion was a 
constant opponent of the Comision Fiscal Permanente because the latter 
exhaustively reviewed the books of mining companies and succeeded in 
collecting significant amounts from many of them in back taxes. To recover 
these taxes the Comision went so far as to appeal to the Supreme Court in 
Sucre, where in 1926 it obtained favourable judgment on two debit notes 
drawn two years earlier against the Patino interests and the Chilean Compania 
Estamfera Llallagua, obliging both companies to pay Bs.1.4 million, 
equivalent to half a million dollars.38 
The formation of the Asociacion was possibly also a response to growing 
labour organisation in the mines and the introduction in the country of the 
first labour laws. By 1925 there had been a series of strikes in the major 
mines and labour unions were established in most enterprises. The 8 hour 
work day had been legislated and there now existed quite extensive rules and 
regulations regarding working conditions including the provision of medical 
services, and initial steps had been taken ensuring mine safety.39 In 1925 a 
new Mining Code was enacted that provided significant improvements in 
labour safety legislation, increased state control over mining concessions, and 
defined them in more detail in order to reduce one of the greatest causes for 
litigation in the industry.40 The establishment of the Asociacion reflects both 
the institutional development of the mining industry and its reaction to the 
progressive intervention of the government. 
By 1929, the main mining companies accounted for 77 percent of total 
exports, and Patino Mines alone was responsible for 46 percent of total 
exports.41 Since the formation of Patino Mines in 1924 there had been a 
significant increase in the combined production of Llallagua and La 
Salvadora (from 16,480 fine long tons in 1923 to 20,926 fine long tons in 
1929) based on investment in new mining and milling machinery and the 
introduction of a new management.42 These improvements were to be tested 
in the depression that ensued in the thirties. 
The Great Depression and Tin Control 
The price of tin started to decline in 1928 due to an oversupply of ore, a 
situation that motivated producers to form the Association of Tin Producers 
in London, in July 1929, for the purpose of voluntarily restricting the 1930 
production. The crash of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929 and 
the beginning of the depression in the USA immediately affected tin, reducing 
its consumption by 11 percent in 1930. This fact, in addition to the 
ineffectiveness of the voluntary restriction of production, forced producers 
to search for a production quota regime at the country level with an 
inter-governmental agreement implementing the system of quotas. The 
scheme took shape in the First International Tin Agreement which lasted 
from 1931 to 1933. This was followed by the Second Agreement (1934-1936) 
and the Third Agreement (1937-1941), all of which were administered by the 
International Tin Council (ITC). The main objective of these agreements was 
to 'assure a fair and reasonable balance between production and consumption' 
and to prevent 'fast and severe oscillations in price...' This was to be 
achieved through the implementation of production quotas. Tin accumulation 
in a Buffer Stock designed to control price oscillations was begun in the 
Second Agreement. However, during the operation of these agreements some 
members, with the consent of the Council, carried out private stock 
accumulation operations.43 
Consumption continued to decrease in 1931 (by 13 percent), reaching its 
minimum level in 1932 with a contraction of 25 percent. Production also 
decreased: 9 percent in 1930, 20 percent in 1931, and almost 33 percent in 
1932. From then on, a gradual recovery began to take place and in 1935 
consumption increased by 19 percent, rising by 7 percent in 1936 and 21 
percent in 1937. Controlled production grew even faster: 37 percent in 1934, 
15 percent in 1935, 31 percent in 1936, and 14 percent in 1937. Finally, 
prices began their recovery in 1932, increasing, though in an irregular 
fashion, by 78 percent between 1932 and 1937.44 
On the domestic front, the depression caused the closing of many mines, 
unemployment and great difficulties for the government because the mining 
industry was the primary source of foreign exchange.45 From 1930 to 1939, 
tin exports decreased at an annual rate of 3.6 percent, reaching their lowest 
level in 1933 when 14,957 fine MT were exported (Table 1), a level similar 
to that of 1901-03. In 1937 Bolivian production dropped to 12 percent of 
world production (its lowest level since 1904), and ended the decade with 17 
percent of world production in 1939.46 
By late 1929, mining interests had demanded a rebate in railroad freight 
and the liberty to readjust wages. In 1930 the Asociacion de Industrials 
Mineros formally requested from the government: non-intervention of the 
state in setting wages; reduction in railroad freight for ore exports and 
imported materials (such as gasoline, petroleum and dynamite); the creation 
of a Caja de Seguros e Indemnizaciones to relieve the companies of social 
security obligations; and a devaluation of currency. The Asociacion was 
fearful of the social consequences of worker lay-offs. President Hernando 
Siles (1926-1930) had committed his support for these measures, but could 
not meet his promises because he was overthrown in July 1930 by a Military 
Junta.47 
The Depression imposed changes in the country's fiscal and monetary 
policy. In 1931, after Britain abandoned the gold standard, Bolivia did 
likewise and stopped payments on its external debt. The government now had 
to set the rate of exchange and, being unable to resort to foreign credit, 
needed to find new ways of solving its constant budget deficits. In both cases 
the tin industry played a preeminent role and its behaviour became the subject 
of public scrutiny. In the setting of the exchange rate for the pound sterling, 
the mine-owners had to confront the interests of importers, who wanted to 
maintain the exchange rate and lobbied hard for an adequate supply of foreign 
exchange. The mining interests, on the other hand, urgently required a 
devaluation in order to lower their local costs and were obviously opposed to 
foreign exchange control. This confrontation alienated the big mining 
companies - Patino, Hochschild and Aramayo - from the interests of the 
commercial import sector.48 
Perhaps one of the most important effects of the Depression was greater 
government participation in the mining industry in general, principally 
through the allocation and enforcement of export quotas. The distribution of 
these quotas, in turn, required the institutionalisation of the small mining 
industry in Camaras Departamentales and, thereafter, of the medium mining 
industry in the Asociacion Nacional de Mineros Medianos established in 
1939.49 Quota distribution caused tensions both among the big mining 
companies (Patino, Hochschild and Aramayo) as well as between them and 
the medium and small mining enterprises. When the disputes were aired in 
the national press, the apparent cohesion of the mining sector broke down 
both before the government and public opinion. Moreover, these public 
controversies allowed the middle class to become more conscious of the 
strategic importance of mining to the country and more sensitive to the 
confrontations between state and mining interests. 
In 1909 a Department of Mining had been established in the Ministry of 
Industry. Its main responsibility was to gather information from the mining 
industry such as production statistics and costs, but most of its efforts were 
dedicated to surveying and establishing mining concessions. It was not until 
the administration of Colonel David Toro (1936-37) that a Ministry of Mining 
and Petroleum was set up, in 1937, and the main part of the export quota 
distribution, which was considered a financial matter, was handled through 
the Ministry of Finance. 
The internal distribution of export quotas between 1931-35 was based on 
1929 production capacity. That is, the tonnage exported in 1929 by each 
group or company was taken as base figure on which the percentage of 
restriction imposed by the ITC was calculated. During 1938-39, the 
government used 1937 production capacities as the base year. Export quotas 
were distributed by the government to each mining group within the large 
mining industry; to each company in the medium mining companies 
(producing more than 60 fine MT/year but less than Patino, Hochschild and 
Aramayo), and to the departmental Chamber of Mining in the small mining 
industry.50 
After closing the high-cost Araca and Oploca mines, the Patino Group only 
worked in Patino Mines (Llallagua); the Aramayo Group paralysed workings 
in Animas, Tasna and Chocaya and only worked in Chorolque; and the 
Hochschild Group concentrated all their production in Unificada, Potosi. 
Despite these measures, production restrictions due to export quotas had 
severe consequences on the big mines. Production in Patino Mines decreased 
from 20,800 fine MT in 1929 to 8,000 fine MT in 1932. The general 
manager reported that over half the mine was paralysed and miners worked 
only five days per week. They returned to hand-drilling to employ the most 
labour possible, and the lower levels of the mine were allowed to flood to 
eliminate pumping expenses. The mill only worked one 8 hour shift, five 
days a week. Wages were reduced in line with production cut-backs.51 
Beginning in 1933, however, the government reserved its right on 50 
percent of any increase in the Bolivian quota. This enabled it to distribute the 
quota between the different mining sectors in order to offset distortions due 
to the use of the base year (1929) in the distribution, and/or to export it 
directly to generate foreign currency.52 This latter measure was taken in 
view of the foreign exchange shortage and the need of covering the 
considerable expenses stemming from the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-
35). The quota distribution had also been subject to financing contracts 
entered into between the mining interests and the state. Between 1931 and 
1935, financing from the mining industry to the state, in the form of 
advances, amounted to £2,690,398, equivalent to 29.5 percent of the total 
income of the National Budget during that period.53 This finance was 
distributed as follows: 
Patino Group 77.8% 
Hochschild Group 11.7% 
Aramayo Group 6.3% 
Medium miners 4.2% 
Total 100.0% 
Often contracts stipulated that the export quota of the Group would be 
increased or maintained. These advances usually went to cover war expenses, 
but were also used to stem many economic and political crises.54 
The internal distribution of quotas was only necessary from 1931 to 1933. 
Between 1933 and 1937, Bolivia could not meet its export quota, so there was 
no need to restrict production through export quotas. In the first period 
(1931-1933), Bolivia exceeded her quota assigned by the ITC as a result of 
production increases in small and medium sized mines that had started in 
1932, when the price began to improve. As a result, in April 1933, the Patino 
and Aramayo groups voluntarily handed over part of their quotas to the small 
mining industry. Between 1934 and 1937, there was under-export because the 
quota assigned to Bolivia by the ITC was too high relative to her long-run 
production capacity. There was a labour shortage, and the large mining 
companies were particularly reluctant to export because of their opposition 
to the system of mandatory delivery of export drafts.55 The share of total 
export receipts delivered by tin producers to the government increased from 
43 percent in 1932 to 52.6 percent in 1934, and fell back somewhat to 47 
percent after the Chaco War.56 In order to encourage production, which 
remained the primary foreign exchange source for the state, the government 
was forced to negotiate contracts with the mining companies. These contracts 
tied reductions in the percentage of foreign exchange delivery to increases in 
production. 
Production problems in mining were also due to the impoverishment of 
deposits and to the lack of investment in new concentration processes from 
the end of the 1920s. In the Llallagua mine (Patino), the average grade of tin 
ore reserves (assays of the ore fed to the mill) dropped by 18 percent (from 
4.11 to 3.35 percent tin in ore) between 1930 and 1939; and in the Animas 
mine (Aramayo) by 27 percent (from 6.0 to 4.4 percent) in the same 
period.57 We must also not lose sight of the limitations imposed by an 
inadequate labour supply, specially the qualified labour that was conscripted 
into the Armed Forces for the Chaco War. In Patino Mines, for example, 
during the first six months of the War, 1,000 workers were drafted, 
representing almost 50 percent of the labour force employed.58 It was not 
until 1933 that qualified personnel was exempted from military recruitment, 
and in 1934 exemption was extended to all personnel employed in the mining 
industry.59 The labour shortage compelled the mining companies to bring 
miners from Chile and Peru, but these attempts did not produce the expected 
results: foreign workers did not prove to be efficient, and they caused 
problems with native miners over wage differentials. For the first time, 
women were employed inside the mines. At Patino Mines, women worked 
inside the mine from 1935 to 1939, and in 1937 a maximum of 313 women 
were employed within the mine interior while 202 women worked outside the 
mine.60 Labour shortage was also a reason for reducing development work 
(prospecting and preparation of the mine) because the scarce labour available 
was deployed indirect exploitation between 1932 and 1935. As a result, when 
the market improved and export restrictions were lifted, mines such as 
Llallagua underwent a reserve shortage.61 
Labour scarcity lasted until well after the war. To promote employment in 
the mining industry, the companies obtained from the government exemption 
from military service for all those working in the industry and also negotiated 
an amnesty for those that had not served in the Chaco War and were willing 
to be employed in the mines. The post-war period was one of strong labour 
competition among mining companies as well as between these and the public 
works programmes (particularly on roads) undertaken by the different 
governments. Roads replaced railways as the main source of competition for 
labour for the mining industry in the mid-thirties and forties.62 This was a 
period when the industry was obliged to resort to recruitment methods such 
as enganche (conscription) in order to obtain labour. It even attempted to 
recruit Bolivian labourers in Northern Argentina through this system. 
Enganche labour accounted for over a third of the total labour force in Patino 
Mines between 1934 and 1944, and reached its peak in 1938 and 1939 when 
it represented 58 and 59 percent, respectively.63 
The restrictions on production imposed by the quota system restrained new 
- and often necessary - investment in mining. The only major investments in 
this period were those by Mauricio Hochschild, who invested approximately 
two million dollars in the development of Colquiri, the construction of a 
modern mill and a 2,000 kw hydro-electric plant.64 Between 1935 and 1940, 
annual production increased from 250 to 5,200 fine MT. In the Cerro de 
Potosi, Empresa Minera Unificada doubled its annual production between 
1930 and 1939, reaching 3,288 fine MT, based on investments in new mining 
properties, mill machinery, and new water sources.65 Other factors 
inhibiting new investment were the diminished availability of foreign 
exchange (caused by the increase in delivery to the state at the official rate), 
and the uncertainty provoked by the new post-war nationalism and policies, 
such as the nationalisation of Standard Oil in 1938, the decree of the German 
Busch administration (1937-1939) giving the state a 100 percent control of 
foreign exchange, and the incursion of the state in ore trading with the 
creation of Banco Minero in 1936. 
While the 1920s saw the development of an efficient taxation system for 
the mining industry, the 1930s was a decade in which the state succeeded in 
substantially diminishing the expatriation of mining profits through the 
mandatory delivery of foreign currency. Moreover, by exchanging the 
foreign currency delivered by the mining companies at the official 
(overvalued) rate, the state succeeded in further burdening the mining sector 
with an additional tax. This implicit tax increased from 12.07 percent of the 
value of mining exports in 1936 to 16.68 percent in 1938, falling to 13.49 
percent in 1939. The effect of the measure was to increase the percentage of 
total taxes paid by the mining industry to 13.8 percent from an average of 9.2 
percent for the previous decade.66 In Patino Mines, exchange difference tax 
in the second half of the 1930s exceeded both export and profit taxes and 
accounted for 59 percent of total taxes paid (Table 3). The mining industry 
also had to bear a loss in its accumulated balances from the devaluation of the 
boliviano, from Bs. 19.55 per pound sterling in 1933 to Bs. 141.40 in 1939. 
The effect of these measures on the development of the national economy 
as a whole, however, was not as expected. Large amounts of bolivianos were 
accumulated in the country without finding any productive investments. The 
Banco Mercantil, for example, had accumulated £650,000 in current accounts 
in 1933 and was forced to suspend interest payments on these deposits 
'whatever their term or conditions'.67 The increase in foreign exchange 
delivery forced Patino Mines to accumulate Bs. 19 million in 1935 (equivalent 
to 34 percent of the effective National Budget income or 10 percent of 
effective expenditure) 'for which no use or safe investment [had] been 
found'.68 Patino Mines tried several investments with these accumulated 
balances: (1) investments in mining (2) diversification into other areas, and 
(3) loans. Mining investment was concentrated in exploration of new mining 
properties and new minerals, particularly gold, and buying shares in existing 
mining companies (such as Compania Minera y Agricola Oploca de Bolivia). 
The main diversification efforts consisted of investments in the Chapare 
region of Cochabamba to develop a timber industry and cattle rearing, to 
supply the mines with timber for struts and meat (this fell through because of 
bureaucratic obstacles), and the purchase of the Foundation Company's 
cement plant in Viacha (La Paz) which also did not materialise because 
Patino Mines was unable to reach an agreement on how much of the final 
price would be paid in hard currency. Patino Mines did invest in the Credito 
Hipotecario and in the newly formed Banco Minero in 1938. The company 
also purchased a significant portion - Bs. 5.9 millions worth - of the Banco 
Minero's shares. Finally, loans were made to banks, and other mining 
companies (such as the Bolivian Tin Corporation) and agricultural enterprises 
(SAGIC) in which Patino Mines had interests.69 
This exceptional 'capital saturation' of the local market clearly requires 
further study. It provides an idea of the very limited capacity for capital 
absorption in the Bolivian economy and the perceived 'country risk' by both 
foreign and local investors. It therefore raises doubts on the axiom - implicit 
in many studies on pre-nationalisation mining industry - that higher tax on 
mining industry would produce greater economic development. 
The Second World War and nationalisation 
The tin market operated under severely controlled conditions through most 
of the 1940s due to the Second World War. The London Metal Exchange 
ceased to quote tin in December 1941, when the Japanese entered the war. 
Until 1949 both the price and the buying and selling of tin were largely 
controlled by the British government. The market price was therefore not 
solely determined by demand and supply. The USA also intervened in the 
market in 1940 buying the ITC tin stocks, and the US government began to 
negotiate the provision of tin directly with Congo and Bolivia in the following 
year, playing an active and direct participation in the market.70 In light of 
British and US intervention, there was no need for the ITC to limit the 
production and/or exercise control on the market. Although a fourth and last 
agreement (1942-1946) was formally signed under the sponsorship of the 
ITC, its real function was slight. In the post-war period a new group of 
countries was formed to control the market, on the expectation there could 
be a tin surplus. This time the group consisted of both producers and 
consumers - the ITC was an exclusively producers organisation - and was 
denominated the International Group for Tin Studies, which operated from 
1948 to 1956.71 
During the Second World War the governments of Great Britain and the 
United States had to compete for the provision of tin ores even more sharply 
than during World War One. Great Britain did not want to loose its hegemony 
on the market, and the USA wanted to reduce its dependence on metallic tin 
provision from Great Britain. Thus, on 4 November 1940, the principal 
Bolivian producers, with the important exception of Patino, signed a contract 
for their total production with the Metal Reserve Company of the USA. This 
ore was processed in a new smelter that the US government installed in 
Texas; clearly with the political objective of reducing its dependence on 
foreign processing, because this foundry was uneconomical. The contract 
provided for the sale of all of the companies' production, approximately 
18,000 fine long tons (about 50 percent of the Bolivian production), at a price 
of 48 1/2 US dollar cents per pound of contained tin FOB (free on board) US 
ports. This price was increased to 60 cents FOB Antofagasta and/or Mollendo 
in 1942; and to 62 and 63 1/2 cents in 1945.72 When the war ended, 
however, prices were decreased from 63 1/2 cents in late 1945 to 58 1/2 in 
about the middle of 1946. The Patino group did not participate in this 
contract because they already had a contractual agreement with the British 
smelter, Williams Harvey, to whom they kept selling during the war at prices 
and conditions similar to those applied to the rest of the Bolivian producers 
by Metals Reserve. 
The similarity of both prices and conditions for the Bolivian ores between 
the British and US markets, despite the competition between both, reflects the 
slight probability of Bolivia having lost a major opportunity for obtaining 
better prices during the war - a view frequently to be found in the traditional 
historiography. The fact that tin was not a metal used directly by the 
armaments industry enabled the consumer countries to control its demand 
through prohibitions and substitution. Furthermore, the high level of 
inventories they managed to accumulate demonstrates that demand was not 
as essential for the war effort as has been believed.73 
Though there was no proper market price, the price negotiated between the 
producers and the British and US governments rose in the first half of the 
1940s. This increase was accompanied by an increase in Bolivian production 
during the war period. In the second half of the decade, Bolivian production 
experienced a decline that continued until the 1950s (see Graph 1). Two 
distinct periods can be distinguished between the years 1940 and 1952: 
1940-45, when exports grew at an annual rate of 2.3 percent, and 1946-1952 
when they decreased at 2.7 percent (Table 1). During the first period, 
Bolivian production reached its highest level as a percentage of world 
production: 49 percent in 1945. In the second half of the forties, the fall in 
national production and the entrance to the world market of the production 
from the Asiatic territories (formerly occupied by Japan during the war), 
meant that Bolivian production returned to pre-war levels of world 
importance, ending the decade with 21 percent of world production.74 
Although the war meant that the restrictions on production (previously 
imposed by the ITC) were cancelled, with a rise in prices and in Bolivian 
production (see Graph 1), the industry was by no means free of problems. 
Amongst these were the difficulty in the provision of basic materials, and the 
increase in freight and insurance costs. However, because of the importance 
of Bolivian tin for the USA, Washington gave preference to the orders of the 
mining industry and even froze the prices of certain spare parts and 
machinery. The rise in freight and insurance costs was also regulated and 
later absorbed by the Metal Reserve Corporation when the delivery condition 
for the mineral ore was changed from CIF US ports to FOB Latin American 
ports. However, these measures only partially alleviated the difficulties 
which continued throughout the conflict. 
The USA also dispatched technical missions during the war to evaluate 
reserves and improve tin production by introducing new methods and 
machinery, particularly in ore dressing. The purpose of the mission was to 
'do all in its power to get the maximum of tin from Bolivian mines in the 
shortest possible time as a vitally necessary contribution to the winning of the 
war by the United States'.75 While the effect of these missions on the 
productivity of the Bolivian mining industry as a whole is not clear, they 
certainly secured some improvements in concentration methods with the 
introduction of better machinery (Sullivan concentration tables) to recover tin 
from the tailings, which had previously been impossible.76 The US 
government also provided capital in form of soft loans through the Metals 
Reserve Corporation to several medium-sized and small mining companies 
in order to increase production. A $365,000 advance was made for the 
development and operation of the 'Santa Teresa Placer' which did not meet 
expectations. The Bolivian International Mining Corporation also received 
an advance of $150,000 to rehabilitate its dredge in 1944.77 A Mining 
Development Fund was established.78 Independently of the US efforts, the 
tin mining industry successfully introduced new processes such as the sink 
and float preconcentration system and attempted, this time unsuccessfully, to 
introduce volatilisation for the treatment of low grade ore with Hochschild's 
Tainton plant. 
The introduction of the sink and float preconcentration process enabled the 
grade of the ore fed to the mill to be improved and the process of manual 
selection, traditionally performed by palliris (women hand-sorters), was 
mechanised, in 1943 at Colquiri and in 1945 (with an investment of 
approximately $600,000) in Catavi (the Llallagua mill).79 Additionally, new 
mining methods were introduced for mass ore exploitation by block caving 
enabling the working on lower grade sectors. Sink and float was also adopted 
by Empresa Minera Unificada in 1948.80 The attempt to volatilise low grade 
tin was a product of years of research by U.C. Tainton in Baltimore, financed 
by Hochschild. After satisfactory laboratory tests, Tainton proposed the 
installation of a pilot plant for 250 daily tons, which started operations in 
1944. (It is estimated that the investment in the development of this project 
and the construction of the plant exceeded one million dollars). The causes 
for the failure of this plant are not fully evident but everything seems to show 
that the altitude was the cause of the failure to reproduce the US laboratory 
results in Potosi.81 In addition to their experiments with the sink and float 
plants and Tainton process the principal tin groups - Patino and Hochschild 
- were also carrying out research on methods for improving concentration, 
in important laboratories (Batelle) and universities (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology) in the USA.82 That is to say, they were still investing in new 
technologies and plants in the country, at least up to the first half of the 
1940s. Indeed, investment in mining as a whole (measured by the yearly 
average value of mining capital goods imported) had been significant during 
the period 1940-44, equalling for the first time the level reached in the 
five-year period preceding the Great Depression, which was identified as one 
of high investment in mining industry.83 
Once the war ended, Bolivian production began to fall. The inability of the 
tin mining industry to respond to the post-war price increase for the first time 
in fifty years (see Graph 1) was due to several factors. Among these the most 
important were the impoverishment of deposits, high tax rates, foreign 
exchange controls, and constant increase in cost. But while these were 
immediate causes, political instability, radicalisation of the labour movement 
and a growing nationalism (Gualberto Villarroel administration, 1943-46) 
dissuaded the main companies from making significant new investments. The 
annual average value of capital goods imported for the mining industry fell 
slightly (3 percent) between the first and second half of the forties. Further, 
the spectre of a possible nationalisation was already present in the minds of 
the companies. 
The impoverishment of deposits was not a new phenomenon in tin mining 
industry, but rather a constant process. It has been noted above that the ore 
grades in Patino Mines fell by 18 percent in the 1930s, and by 27 percent in 
the mines of Aramayo. In the 1940s there was an even greater decline: in 
Patino Mines ore head grade dropped 26 percent (from 3.07 percent in 1940 
to 2.27 in 1949); the drop was even more pronounced in the Aramayo mines 
where between 1944 and 1949 alone average ore grades decreased by a full 
48 percent (from averages of 4.09 percent in 1944 to 1.95 percent in 
1949).84 Any notable decay in grade requires that the quantity of ore 
extracted from the mine must be increased in order to maintain the production 
level. The increase in the volume of extracted and treated material, however, 
required higher investments in machinery both within the mine itself and in 
the mill and, obviously, led to higher production costs per fine pound. In the 
existing climate of uncertainty - in terms of the tin market because of the end 
of the war and with respect to national politics for the reasons already 
mentioned - investments were not being made. Another reason for the lack 
of investment was the fall in profit margins, due in good measure to 
progressively rising production costs and taxes. In the forties Patino Mines 
was paying over twice the amount of taxes than in the second half of the 
1920s. Total annual taxes paid increased from an average of £415,100 for the 
period 1924-29 to an annual average of £1,1167,500 in the first half of the 
1940s and £1,2312,300 in the second half (Table 3). There is a perceptible 
correspondence between these figures and the fact that the average annual 
profits for Patino Mines decreased from $4,082,000 in the six-year period 
between 1940-1945 to $2,439,000 in the 1946-1951 period.85 
Impoverishment of deposits, increases in costs, and general political 
uncertainty of the mining industry's future, all caused reduction of personnel 
in companies such as Patino Mines (Table 2) and retrenchment of operations 
in many mines (Huanuni in 1945, for example), whilst obliging others to 
consider the total paralisation of their operations. This was the case of 
Compania Minera Oruro in 1947. At the prospect of a monthly loss of 
$50,000, the management notified the government that they would shut down 
operations leaving 2,500 miners unemployed. In view of the acute social 
problems this would have caused, the administration of Enrique Hertzog 
(1947-1949) took it upon itself to operate this mine through the Banco 
Minero. Initially, the Banco Minero succeeded in increasing production 
substantially. The financial results of this operation, however, are not clear. 
The primary objective of the state was to obtain foreign currency and 
improve the living status of the mining workers.86 
The high costs and heavy tax burden did not only affect the big mining 
industry, nor did they solely occur in the second half of the 1940s. All sectors 
of the Bolivian mining industry (large, medium and small) already knew and 
expressed complaint at these problems - aggravated after the war - in 1942, 
at the Second National Mining Congress. In this Congress, the companies 
stressed their disadvantageous situation compared with the Asiatic producers. 
Whilst in Malaya the tin mining industry paid a tax of $120 per metric ton 
and daily wages of $0.15, in Bolivia taxes were more than double this figure 
($300 per metric ton of tin) and daily wages were five times higher 
($0.80).87 These differences are even more significant because production 
costs were considerably lower in Malaya on account of their alluvial tin 
deposits. 
Labour cost increased considerably in the 1940s. The average wage in 
dollars (including social benefits) in the large companies increased 82 percent 
between 1940 and 1944, and 129 percent between 1944 and 1948. This 
increase was principally due to the many social law decrees and regulations 
issued during that decade. In the opinion of the United Nations' Technical 
Assistance Mission to Bolivia, headed by H.L. Keenleyside, which visited 
Bolivia in 1950, this legislation gave the appearance of having been prepared 
hastily, lacked suitable planning and offered distinctly dubious real benefits 
for either workers or employers. The proliferation of social legislation for the 
mining industry caused the cost of contributions to increase to almost 59 
percent of the wage.88 
Besides this direct incidence on production cost, labour indiscipline also 
adversely affected production. Trade union politicisation and the frequent 
support given to labour claims by the Villarroel administration contributed 
to increasing polarisation between labour and capital in the industry. The 
Villarroel administration came to power precisely after the administration of 
Enrique Penaranda (1940-1943) had been weakened by a violent 
confrontation between army troops and mining workers as consequence of a 
strike in Catavi in 1942. This event, which led to loss of life and became 
known as the Catavi Massacre, had a sharp impact on public opinion and was 
effectively denounced by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR) which gained political preeminence through its campaign.89 Once in 
power with Villarroel, the MNR registered appreciable success in organising 
the mining workers. Under its sponsorship, the Federation Sindical de 
Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia was established in 1944. The events of 
Catavi encouraged both increased unionisation and radicalisation of the 
mining labour force, that took shape in the Trotskyist-oriented Tesis de 
Pulacayo, adopted by the FSTMB in 1946. This manifesto promoted union 
militancy and the seizure of the mines, subordinating 'the minimalist union 
demands to the fight for power'.90 Both became prominent symbols of the 
pre-revolutionary period known as the 'sexenio' of conservative government 
(21 July 1946 to 9 April 1952). 
When the MNR assumed power for a second time in 1952, the issue of 
nationalisation was one of the major decisions the party leadership had to 
address.91 There was little consensus within the party on this issue. The 
decision to carry out this measure was undoubtedly made under pressure from 
the new union conferederation, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). Union 
pressure and the fear that the big mining industry might overthrow the 
revolution (as it was believed happened with Villarroel in 1946) led first to 
the establishment of a monopoly of export and sale of mineral ores under the 
aegis of Banco Minero on 2 July 1952. The purpose of this measure was to 
gain full control of the foreign currency generated by the mining industry. 
This was not enough for many in the MNR or much of the labour movement 
and so the Corporation Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) was created on 2 
October to administer the state mines. On the 7th, the government intervened 
the operations of Patino, Hochschild and Aramayo (la Gran Minerfa) and, 
finally, on the 31st of the same month the nationalisation decree was signed 
at the Maria Barzola field - site of the Catavi massacre of 1942. 
The MNR had formed a state commission for the legal, technical and 
economic analysis of the nationalisation in May 1952 the report of which was 
finally submitted on 9 October. Without any doubt the decision to carry out 
the nationalisation was political in character. The report of the committee 
contains proposals from the Hochschild and Patino groups for establishing 
joint companies with the government for mining exploitation - ideas which 
were rejected. Furthermore, the nationalisation of other foreign companies 
was never considered. For example, the International Mining Co. (Mina 
Chojlla, tin and wolfram) of W.R. Grace (USA) or Fabulosa Mines (British) 
(Milluni, tin), both medium sized mining companies and yet neither was 
expropriated. The state only took over the three principal companies of the 
Gran Mineria (responsible for 80 percent of Bolivian tin production) and it 
did so at a time when their deposits were becoming progressively poorer, and 
large investments were required for the development of mass exploitation 
methods. Investment in machinery and equipment had been on the decrease 
for seven years, and the tin market was entering a difficult stage after the 
short boom caused by the Korean War. Moreover, the state was clearly 
inheriting a major labour problem and, in view of the shortage of senior 
Bolivian engineers and managers, it was predictable that subsequent 
difficulties in COMIBOL would confirm the conclusion anticipated by the 
Keenleyside Mission in 1951: 
Even if the nationalisation of the mining industry would be theoretically 
convenient, it would be impossible under the present conditions of 
Bolivia. The government lacks financial resources, and technical and 
administrative competence indispensable to undertake such a task.92 
Conclusion 
Forty years after halting Patino, Hochschild and Aramayo participation in the 
exploitation of Bolivia's mineral wealth, and nationalising these companies, 
the Bolivian government is seeking private capitalists with whom to form 
joint ventures, and it has converted COMIBOL into a holding company. The 
reasons for this turnaround are exceptionally complex and far exceed the 
scope of this paper. Not unlike tin mining development before 
nationalisation, the full story of COMIBOL remains to be written. The 
enormous influence exercised by COMIBOL in Bolivia's social and economic 
development over the past four decades, on the one hand, and the 
underdeveloped stage of Bolivian historiography, on the other, provide major 
obstacles to a comprehensive appraisal of a very polemical subject. Yet there 
are some aspects of COMIBOL that bear on the analysis of tin mining before 
nationalisation. 
The development of COMIBOL may be divided in at least two periods, the 
first covering 1952-1985, and the second from 1985 onwards. During the 
first period, the ideology of state capitalism was generally in vogue and the 
state owned and managed companies exploiting key natural resources, such 
as mining, in order to generate resources for industrialisation. After 1985, 
this development model was brought to an abrupt end when a free market 
regime was implanted by Supreme Decree 21060 that liberalised the 
economy. Almost simultaneously, COMIBOL suffered a severe - effectively 
fatal - blow as a result of the tin crash of 24 October 1985 when prices 
halved (from just over £8,000 to less than £4,000 per long ton). 
It is in the first period (before 1985) that we can consider the recurring 
themes covered in this paper. The rapport between the state and COMIBOL, 
technological development and labour relationships were key elements in the 
operations and essential record of COMIBOL. Moreover, now that the state 
had full control of the principal mining companies, its ability to obtain 
sustained economic development with resources yielded by the mining sector 
became a key question. Unfortunately, however, the results proved little 
different from those evident before nationalisation. Although comparisons in 
Gross Domestic Product growth are not possible because no figures exist 
before 1950, the only serious analysis of the benefits of nationalisation 
concludes that in economic terms it was not indispensable.93 It must be 
admitted that the reasons for this are far from simple, and a lively, complex 
debate has centred mainly on the deficiencies of COMIBOL management, 
labour unrest and low productivity. But one must clearly also take into 
consideration the macro-economic conditions under which the corporation 
had to operate (hyperinflation and an undervalued exchange rate from 1952 
to 1956) and the political constraints it faced.94 For our present purposes it 
is sufficient to highlight the fact that successful natural resource exploitation 
in an underdeveloped economy is always very difficult and complex, and that 
making the mining sector an 'engine for growth' - despite its natural 
shortcomings: capital intensive exploitation, with few backward or forward 
linkages to the rest of the economy - cannot necessarily be resolved either 
by greater taxation or by outright nationalisation. 
It is from this perspective that the development of the industry in the first 
half of the century should be assessed. The richness of the ores and the 
favourable market in the first third of the century greatly assisted the mining 
industry in overcoming very difficult physical conditions. It obtained the 
necessary technological base, capital inputs, and human resources to become 
competitive in world markets. Moreover, the structure that developed 
enabled the creation of a formidable empire in the form of Patino Mines. 
We have also seen that the state was capable of extracting a significant 
portion of the wealth generated through a variety of taxes on the industry. 
The relationship, however, was not well defined. Although a government 
agency was responsible for this relationship from the turn of the century, and 
a Ministry of Mines was set up in 1937, no government was able to develop 
a lasting technical relationship with the mining industry. Rather, the relations 
seem to have been driven predominantly by the different administrations' 
need to obtain fiscal resources. The interest of the state was almost 
exclusively fiscal and therefore short term. There was no explicit policy to 
provide the guidelines to develop a longer term and more comprehensive 
relationship between the major mining companies and the state. In contrast, 
the mining companies, although divided by competition, were well organised 
under their respective corporate associations. 
Another key factor worth stressing is the ability of the mining industry to 
overcome different crises. In both World Wars and the Depression the 
companies accommodated to the changing circumstances and were largely 
able to overcome the major problems confronting them . Similarly, despite 
frequent assertion to the contrary, the main companies were able to keep 
abreast of technological developments, and they introduced both new mining 
and ore dressing techniques to overcome the lowering grades of their 
deposits. Not surprisingly, these investments were threatened by growing 
nationalism and labour unrest, and so decreased in the second half of the 
1940s. 
Finally, it is our contention that, despite the tensions and the problems the 
mining industry faced, the main companies remained interested in working 
the Bolivian tin deposits (even with the state as a partner) in the early 1950s. 
Nationalisation determined otherwise. 
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